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Chapter 1
Introduction
This report deals with the construction of a taxonomy of incidents in com-
munication systems. By taxonomy we mean [15]
the systematic distinguishing ordering and naming of type groups within
a subject field: classification.
The report is organised as follows: the present section concerns a survey
of existing taxonomies, glossaries or controlled languages for computer se-
curity incidents. It starts with a definition of the terms used in this report
and a discussion on the use of taxonomies as measurement tools. The survey
aims at clarifying the importance of the definition of a common language
for exchanging and gathering information on computer security.
The second section presents the original ideas for the taxonomy pro-
posed with this report. The main assumption is in the definition of the
main functions a communication system should perform and in defining a
disruption as the lack of one of these functions.
The third section is the actual presentation of the taxonomy. Some ex-
amples of classification in this taxonomy of known computer security inci-
dents are added. While the overall aim of this work is at the construction of
complete taxonomy for communication systems — including the telecom-
munication services — the examples provided in this section will mainly
deal with disruptions occurring in the Internet domain.
The fourth section presents the future work to be done for continuing
the development of the taxonomy proposed here.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Definitions
By taxonomy we mean, as in the definition quoted above, the ordering of
type groups in the subject field of disruption in communication flows. By
communication flow we mean the current social activity of communicating
within a net of humans and impersonal (software) agents whose main ex-
ample is the Internet. This activity includes publication of web sites, access
to sensitive data, sending of e-mails and other electronic documents. In this
environment, acts of deception performed both by humans and computers
happen. The responsibility for such acts are obviously not at the same
level in case they are performed by human agents instead of non-human
agents. Nevertheless, such acts should be classified in a taxonomy devoted
to incidents in communication systems.
As in the literature, the need for a taxonomy in this field is motivated
by the fact that:
Much of the computer security information regularly gathered and dis-
seminated by individuals and organisations cannot currently be combined or
compared because a “common language” has yet to emerge in the field of
computer security [7].
In the following section, a survey of the publications concerning tax-
onomies related to our theme of investigation is done. This survey includes
the so-called ontologies and few glossaries related to computer security. By
ontology we mean a taxonomy apt to be used by some software tool while
by glossary we mean a list of items associated to their short description
without the objective of constructing an exhaustive classification scheme
for the field.
1.2 The literature on this subject
The subject of this report is purposely general. We consider communication
systems with the broad meaning of a net of agents and channels coordinat-
ing their behaviour around the electronic documents exchanged. Electronic
document has as well the broad meaning of any electronic resource that
needs a computer for being displayed. So, web sites, log files of access to
systems and records of personal data as well as documents composed in the
pdf format are included in this definition.
With this broad spectrum of systems as starting point, there are sev-
eral existing studies on taxonomies for computer and Internet security that
could be considered as relevant to the topic. Starting from the first studies
6
1.2. The literature on this subject
published during the nineties like [14] and [7] to the more recent ontologies
like [3].
It is remarked that [7] is still today the most complete and quoted —
sometimes as the CERT taxonomy — taxonomy. For example, it is taken as
the basis for a new taxonomy in [10] where the skeleton of [7] is preserved
as it is and a new dimension concerning the user’s perception of the effect of
an attack is added. In this work, an indication of the quality of computer
attacks is done on the basis of the number of incidents per category of
the taxonomy. As a second example, [7] is expanded in [9] with the aim
of covering the security evaluation of systems. To this end, new terms
concerning motivation for attacks and more recent techniques are added.
In both cases — [10] and [9] — the original work [7] is kept as the nut for
the new taxonomies.
A similar fundamental work exists in the field of dependability [1]. This
work is the complete report of the analysis started in 1980 of the joint
groups “IEEE–Computer Security on fault tolerant computing” and the
IFIP WG 10.4 on “Dependable computing and fault tolerance”. This work,
together with [7] quoted above, constitute as today the most complete and
exhaustive taxonomies covering computer security and description of faults
in interconnected systems of computers.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth to cite as well the ISO 31000
standard [8] whose guide 73 [5] — prepared by the ISO Technical Manage-
ment Board Working Group on Risk Management Terminology — contains
the basic glossary in English and French on risk management. While not
explicitly addressed to the field of computer security, this standard defines
the basic high level terms in use while dealing with security of systems,
including communication systems.
Among the recent publications it is worth to cite [2] where the focus
of the common language and categorisation is in the legal prosecution and
few sectors and professions (law, military, academia, private sector). Nev-
ertheless, the technical components are represented in terms of high level
categories of terms basically associated to the main hardware devices and
software tools. This categorisation lacks the methodological component of
an attack and, consequently, of the new terms related to these attacks like
trojan, virus and so on.
A good effort in the construction of a specific taxonomy for attack tactics
and tools is [6]. This article is a remarkable effort in collecting and coher-
ently integrating ideas from the literature. Nevertheless, it is remarked that,
in lack of a specific definition of the exploited vulnerability while performing
an attack, the authors propose to use the general categorisation originally
proposed in [7]. In this way, the central contribution of the latter work in
7
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the construction of a taxonomy for computer incidents has been confirmed.
A final remark must be done on glossaries. An exhaustive glossary for
computer security is [16]. While targeted to the finance sector, this glossary
is a valuable source of terms and definitions for the overall field of computer
security. Another useful glossary is [4]. This work, originated as a RFC —
Request For Comments — communication of The Internet Engineering Task
Force, is presently used as a base for the standardisation of communications
on incidents among the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT).
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Chapter 2
Disruption of a strictly
organised information flow
After the literature survey done in the previous chapter, a natural question
arise: why should a new taxonomy be constructed in the field of com-
puter security and computer-based communication systems? The answer
is twofold: first of all the existing taxonomies do not consider communi-
cation systems in general as perceived by a normal user; their origin is in
engineering and analysis of systems. Secondly, the two main taxonomies
mentioned above — [7] and [1] — are based on a strong assumption: the
communication system being described has a non predictable behaviour.
The events within the communication system appear as they were natural
hazards and as such these events are described.
What we propose is a distinct perspective: we define the set of funda-
mental functions that a communication system should perform properly in
order to guarantee its effective work and we define an event as the breaking
of one or more fundamental functions.
2.1 Communication disciplines as functions
of a communication system
We assume that a communication system, in order to work properly, must
perform correctly the functions described by the Communication Disci-
plines. The Communication Disciplines [12] [11] (hereinafter simple the
Disciplines) are conceived starting from the assumption that computers in
our society are a general medium for a strictly organised information flow.
This assumption is coherent with the contemporary view of the communica-
tion network provided by the Internet as a set of channels relating human
9
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and non-human agents coordinating their behaviours on the base of the
messages exchanged.
While written in the seventies, the Disciplines are still today an up-to-
date tool for the analysis and design of communication systems. In this
report, we will not use the Disciplines as an analysis tool for designing
new communication systems. On the contrary, we will assume that the
communication system we are using — the Internet for short — is func-
tioning properly by implementing in the more efficient and complete way
the functions foreseen by the Disciplines. Consequently, we will classify the
disruption experienced in the use of our communication system as a lack in
one or more of the Disciplines.
In the remaining part of this chapter, we will list and describe the twelve
Disciplines and provide some examples related to the functions they foresee.
We will provide as well some examples concerning the lack of functioning
of a communication system implementing properly all the individual disci-
plines. While used here as a mean for describing the correct work of the
communication system based on the Internet, the Disciplines are more gen-
eral. For feeding the intuition, some examples will consequently deal with
traditional communication system like the post services or the telephone
lines.
2.2 Synchronisation
Synchronisation: the partial ordering in terms of causality as opposed to
an absolute ordering in terms of time.
This discipline is concerned with getting proper timing restraints for
different activities. Partial orders are used as synchronisation tools since
they represent well causality and independence relations between activities.
Clocks are not considered as useful synchronisation tools in general, since
the hypothesis of clock signals travelling on the net at a speed greater than
the messages themselves is rejected.
Typical examples of synchronisation of communications in big organ-
isations are related to the rate of success of telephone calls while trying
to reach over the phone some colleague. Designers of banking applications
are well aware of synchronisation problems while establishing protocols that
guarantee the completion in any case of a bank transaction in case the com-
munication line is interrupted in the middle of a commitment. In the case
of coordination for action based on communications with an e-mail system,
there is necessarily a delay between sending and receiving. Moreover, who
receives a communication is in general not aware of who else receives it and
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when. So, while coordinating a group of agents in response to an emergency
situation, e-mail can lead to misunderstandings. From the perspective of
attacks to communication systems, a typical example of a lack of synchro-
nisation is in the so-called Denial of Service attacks. In this case, the lack
in synchronisation between requests to web servers and consequent reply is
used as a mean for disrupting a communication.
2.3 Identification
Identification: this discipline is concerned with the identification process
that must take place if a message is received from outside.
The identification process is something we experience, for example, while
receiving e-mail letters whose header information is altered to make the
message appear to come from a known or trusted source; an operation
commonly called e-mail spoofing. The identification process is obviously
more general than e-mail identification, since it is applied to messages at
all levels: from low level electric signals to the typographic and stylistic
components of a printed document for deciding about the plausibility of its
source.
Concerning breaches of communication systems protocols caused by a
lack in the identification function, a simple example is provided by the so-
called phishing technique in which a web site is altered or copied and users
are re-directed to this fake site. Obviously, in order to be successful, such
kind of breach has to be combined to some wrong addressing mechanism.
The Discipline addressing will be discussed below.
Identification concerns as well more specific processes in communication
systems, an example is in the identification of a competence or of an infor-
mation source. We can experience such lack in identification while, after
a search for a specific service or goods in the Internet, the search engine
displays as ranked in the first positions advertisements or addresses that do
not correspond immediately to the service or goods required.
2.4 Copying
Copying: this discipline concerns the control of the number of copies of
documents and data in relation to the communication channel they are
related to.
The importance of the copies of a message becomes clear if we consider
documents instead of information in general. Keeping under control the
11
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number of copies of confidential documents is the main goal of security of-
ficers in many organisations. In fact, the pragmatic value of a copy of a
document changes if it is obtained through the official channel of authori-
sation for making copies, through the reconstruction from other sources of
the information it contains or by an act of espionage. Electronic transmis-
sion of documents gives to the process more degrees of freedom but is not
different in principle from hard-copying.
Among the examples of non-authorised copying, we can list copying
of credit card numbers, passwords or personal data from a database. A
distinction here could be made between non-authorised copies obtained via
an explicit non-authorised access to a system or obtained via an access to
a system done by exploiting a lack in security design of that system.
2.5 Addressing
Addressing: in its general form, addressing means the description of a route
through a net of channels and agents.
In everyday life, we can experience addressing problems, for example,
while looking for somebody competent in a given subject, or while looking
for somebody that was able to solve a problem for us in the past. We expe-
rience addressing problems as well while continuing a discussion initiated
in a meeting by e-mail: in a meeting a communication is addressed in a
synchronous way to all of the participants in the meeting and the confirma-
tion of receipt is immediate. On the contrary, while using an e-mail system
the first condition is true only in the case of broad-casted messages as the
addressing mechanism while return receipts are necessarily asynchronous.
In single computer systems, we can experience a lack in the addressing
discipline when the paths in the local file system are badly defined and
some applications do not work because some data or executable programs
are not found.
Addressing through the Internet concerns a complex interaction of tech-
nique and human choices. The use of DNS — Domain Name System —
for naming and conversion between symbolic names and ip addresses of
computers is only one facet of the addressing discipline.
In the modern use of typographical composition of an Internet page, a
complex construction of a set of addresses is sometimes needed for obtaining
the final form of a document. Components of a document can be addressed
dynamically as a consequence of the used browser, geographical location of
the user, the history of his access to the Internet, information stored locally
as cookies.
12
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2.6 Naming
Naming: the act of giving names is fundamental for the correct functioning
of a communication system. Entities cannot be named in an arbitrary or
uncontrolled way.
As in the everyday life personal identifiers, telephone numbers and credit
cards numbers cannot be attributed in an arbitrary way, in communication
systems, the act of naming must be regulated.
At the lowest level of control of a communication system, we experience
a lack in attribution of names when individual files or directory names are
given in an inconsistent way. At a higher level of complexity, the whole
subject of interoperability of metadata associated to records or documents
exchanged in a communication system depends on distinct naming disci-
plines in distinct contexts.
At the level of naming of Internet entities, the principal example for the
naming discipline is in the collection of procedures associated to the DNS
service. Today, this component of the Internet is felt as a weak point.
Another example involving identification, naming and addressing is re-
lated to the ipv4 and ipv6 protocols . The use of the wide range of individual
names for devices available through the ipv6, the naming discipline can be
seen as a mean for identifying univocally the user of a resource. In this way,
some practical and legal problems related to the billing for Internet services
and disclosure of the user’s names dynamically associated to ipv4 addresses
by the Internet providers could be solved technically.
2.7 Cancellation
Cancellation: this discipline concerns various levels of correction or update
of information.
We can interpret the discipline of cancellation in a simple way as the
destruction of a document or its removal from a communication system.
Nevertheless, several documents can contain similar information and a dis-
cipline that guarantees a complete cancellation is not easy to obtain. More-
over, cancellation can have several pragmatic aspects dependent from the
channels over which the order of cancellation and the object of the cancel-
lation order are transmitted.
A simple but abstract example for this discipline is in the revocation of
an order that, for being effective, should travel in an opposite way in respect
to the path taken by the order itself. In this interpretation, a correct design
for a communication system should guarantee that documents run always
13
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through cyclic paths.
A more practical example of errors caused by a lack in the correction
of an information is in the propagation of the update of the DNS table of
addresses in the DNS hierarchy when some symbolic names are re-allocated
to new physical addresses. Another example we can find in the Internet
world is in the delay in updating cached web pages accessed via some proxy
server. In this case, a new page can erroneusly be displayed as the old
one and a similar situation can happen with the local cache of the Internet
browser. More subtle problems can be caused by the process of revocation
of digital certificates issued by a certification authority or by some node in
a chain of trust.
2.8 Composition
Composition: This discipline is related to the format taken by an electronic
document and the necessity and sufficiency of a specific format for being
pertinent to a given communication channel.
An example for this discipline we may find in our common experience –
in the standardised formats for official documents. Header, footer, stamps,
declaration of affiliation of the signatory of the document can be a neces-
sary condition for the belonging of the document itself to a specific com-
munication channel. In big organisations, a document belongs to a specific
workflow if its format is typographically composed in a specific way.
In modern communication systems, metadata are associated to docu-
ments and define its identity. Some documents cannot be displayed by
dedicated retrieval systems if their metadata is not defined in a specific
way. In order to counterfeit an electronic document, its metadata should
be counterfeit as well and production of plausible fake documents passes
through the reproduction of the right metadata structure for them.
Documents can obviously be used by non-human agents in a line of
communication. For example, an electronic document can be a digital cer-
tificate. In this case, in order to counterfeit it, together with the correct
internal structure of the certificate, the digital signature of the certification
authority should be known.
2.9 Modelling
Modelling: modelling substantially means to understand the reasons and
meaning of a model for communication systems that reflect part of the
14
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environment in which they are used.
A traditional example of a model of a communication system is in the
configuration of the telephone switchboard for big organisations. The de-
cision about how many telephone lines have to be dedicated to the fire
brigades, to the internal security, how many to the director’s office. In
cases of emergency, all the normal users phones have no more access to
external lines or are plainly switched off. All these decisions incorporate
some element from the environment in which the telephone system has to
operate.
A specific error in modelling of communication systems happens when
a model working well in a specific context is applied without reflection to
another context. We see this situation when, for example, computer tools
used with success for forums, blogs or similar social networks are used
for the organisation of more specific information flows like decision-making
processes.
An example of a lack in modelling related to Internet protocols is in the
misuse of the collaborative principles implicitly assumed in the first versions
of the protocols themselves. The first Internet mail protocol — SMTP,
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, designed exploiting the collaborative effort
of several mail servers in delivering the e-mail communications — worked
very well in the research environment in which it was designed but has been
subject to several modifications and restriction of use for avoiding improper
use as soon as it has been applied in the modern Internet environment.
An example that connects economical choices and communication mod-
els is in the indexing storage systems for Internet search engines. The first
models were based on distributed indexing services willing to share the in-
formation collected and allowing for duplications of the indexes. The “win-
ning” model today, on the contrary, is the one of proprietary and centralised
indexes.
2.10 Authorisation
Authorisation: this discipline rules the assignment of access rights and the
assignment of the right to issue directives. It schedules the obligations
associated to the access rights and the methods of supervision.
Obvious examples of lack in authorisation are in the uncontrolled access
to sensitive documents and in directives issued without controlling their
execution. As a simple example for this latter case, consider “out-of-office
autoreply” messages sent while the owner of the mailbox is present in his
office.
15
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More complicated situations — leading sometimes to legal problems —
can arise when computers are used as impersonal agents for the execution of
Internet attacks. When a third party (not the owner nor the administrator
of the computer) uses a weakness in the design of the operating system for
gaining its temporary control, to whom should be given the legal responsi-
blity for having authorised the use of the computer?
2.11 Valuation
Valuation: this discipline is related to the access to information and the
value we are willing to pay for obtaining an information. Here access to the
information is not intended as authorisation but as availability.
In the domain of Internet, we can find examples of information hidden in
a complicated web site. It is indeed published but practically non-accessible
since we do not know where it is.
On the contrary, the apparent ease of access to any kind of web page
obtained via the search engines is convincing most of the Internet users
that the organisation of the information does not add any value to the
information itself. In a naive interpretation, what is not found by the
preferred search engine simply does not exist, independently from the order
given to list of the retrieved items or from the exclusion of an item from
the displayed list.
In this discipline enters as well the filtering of web sites operated by
some countries, some times at the level of DNS. In these cases, informa-
tion disappears from the Internet independently from the organisation and
effectiveness in retrieval of the search engines.
2.12 Delegation
Delegation: This discipline concerns the delegation of tasks from one agency
to another in the communication network. Agents can be both personal and
impersonal.
Examples of delegation from a personal to impersonal agents are in the
mentioned “out-of-office auto-reply” functions provided by e-mail systems
or in the “majordomo” senders of mailing lists. In the technical realisation
of packet transmission, delegation between nodes for the routing of packets
is the basic communication mechanism.
16
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2.13 Re-organisation
Re-organisation: this discipline is related both to the specification of the
system behaviour for reacting to a new situation and to the rules to be
followed when a re-organisation is in place somewhere.
All of the reactive systems are subject to some re-organisation. Spe-
cific examples of lack in re-organisation can be found in industrial control
systems where, for examples, damages are caused by the uncertainty of
the rules to be followed when the system is working in a new modality.
In the Internet domain, packet transmission is subject to some level of re-
organisation in case a communication line is broken.
In the following chapter, the Disciplines will be used as (non mutually
exclusive) categories for the classification of Internet incidents.
17

Chapter 3
Taxonomy
3.1 Description and method
The classification system we propose is based on the following table:
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The axes of the table display the two perspectives for the classification of
incidents. These two perspectives are: functional and physical.
On the horizontal dimension, the Disciplines — as explained in the pre-
vious chapter — represent the correct functioning of a generic communica-
tion system. On the vertical dimension, five generic categories are listed.
These categories, whose source is a general schema for the classification of
publications [13], represent the “physical” dimension of the incident to the
commmunication system we want to categorise. This “physical” dimension
is divided in five classes: space, time, matter, process and result. Space and
time refer, respectively, to the location and time of the incident — origin,
target and duration are considered if it is the case — while matter refers
to the material object of the incident. In our case, by material object of
19
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the incident we decided to list both the machines involved or the portion
of the communication channels disrupted. The category process requires a
more detailed explanation: we assume that the use of any communication
system is related to some social activity. This activity can be, for example,
publication of documents through a web site, retrieval of the documents
published in this way, sending or receiveing e-mail communications and so
on . . . Consequently, by process, we mean the activity interruped by the
fault in the communication system we want to categorise. The category
result is on the contrary self-explaining: by this term we mean the output
of the incident.
The points in the table coordinated by the Disciplines and the five ver-
tical categories, when marked by an ‘x’, represent the functional lack in the
communication system we want to categorise.
In the remainig part of this chapter, we will provide some examples and
explanation for the categorisation chosen. The ten examples chosen are
listed below with their respective references.
1. The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan move-
ment.
Authors: Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson. Available at:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-746.pdf
2. Impact of the 2003 Blackouts on Internet Communications - Preliminary
Report.
Authors: James H. Cowie, Andy T. Ogielski, BJ Premore, Eric A. Smith
and Todd Underwood, Renesys Corporation www.renesys.com November
21, 2003 (updated March 1, 2004). Available at:
http://www.renesys.com/tech/reports/Renesys BlackoutReport.pdf
3. Cyber-war in Estonia and the Middle East.
Author: Aviram Jenik Network Security, 2009, Issue 4, April 2009,
Pages 4–6. Available at:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353485809700376
4. Global Energy Cyber-attacks: Night Dragon.
Available at:
http://www.mcafee.com/ca/resources/white-papers/wp global energy cy-
berattacks night dragon.pdf
5. Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Internet Infrastructure.
Authors: James Cowie, Alin Popescu and Todd Underwood. Available
20
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at:
http://www.renesys.com/tech/presentations/pdf/Renesys-Katrina-Report-
9sep2005.pdf
6. DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach “Operation Black Tulip”.
Available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk/documenten-en publicaties/
rapporten/2011/09/05/diginotar-public-report-version-1.html
7. Evidence of Advanced Persistent Threat: A Case Study of Malware for
Political Espionage.. Available at:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6112333
8. W32. Stuxnet Dossier. Available at:
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security response
/whitepapers/w32 stuxnet dossier.pdf
9. Malicious activity associated with Aurora Internet Explorer Exploit, US-
CERT Alert TA10-055A. Available at:
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA10-055A.html
10. EU sites blocked for anonymous users. Available at:
http://www.whioam.com/eu sites blocked access by users of anonymizing
services
At the present state of development of the method we are not able to
give a criterion for distinct associations of lacks in functions (the perspective
of the Disciplines) with individual “physical” dimensions. Consequently,
when a lack is found, the whole column related to that discipline will be
filled in with ‘x’. The study about a finer classification relating individual
disciplines to individual “physical” dimensions will be the first subject of
the future improvements of our method.
In the following sections, a brief description of the incidents listed above
will be followed by our proposal of classification in agreement with the table
and method described above.
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3.2 The Snooping Dragon: Social-malware
surveillance of the Tibetan movement
In this incident, email attachments appeared to have been the favoured
strategy to deliver malicious payloads. The attackers took the trouble to
write emails that appeared to come from co-workers: emails were sent to
monks, purporting to come from other monks, but that had in fact come
from outside. The attackers probably used publicly-accessible mailing-list
archives to construct the social-malware emails that they sent to their first
targets. The attackers appear to have obtained user passwords through the
intrusion and later used these to remotely access the OHHDL (Office of His
Holyness Dalai Lama) mail server.
S
y
n
ch
ro
n
is
at
io
n
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
C
op
y
in
g
A
d
d
re
ss
in
g
N
am
in
g
C
an
ce
ll
at
io
n
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
A
u
th
or
is
at
io
n
V
al
u
at
io
n
D
el
eg
at
io
n
R
e-
or
ga
n
is
at
io
n
Space India x x
Time 2008 x x
Matter
PCs in
the Dalai
Lama
office
x x
Process
e-mail
exchange
x x
Result
Surveil-
lance
x x
Reason for the classification:
Lack in identification of the “fake” letters.
Unauthorised copy of information.
3.3 Impact of the 2003 Blackout on
Internet Communications
This incident deals with the reliability of Internet during the wide-area
failure of the electric power grid in Northeastern US and Canada on 1416
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August, 2003. At 16:10 EDT on August 14, a cascading power grid failure
rippled across a large sector of the Northeastern US and Ontario, Canada.
Within two minutes, the outage was complete across the region. According
to the estimates, there were over 9,700 networks in the geographic area
affected by blackout. 3,175 networks suffered from abnormal connectivity
outages. Of those, more than 2,000 networks suffered severe connectivity
outages for longer than 4 hours, and over 1,400 networks for longer than 12
hours (some even longer than 48 hours).
S
y
n
ch
ro
n
is
at
io
n
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
C
op
y
in
g
A
d
d
re
ss
in
g
N
am
in
g
C
an
ce
ll
at
io
n
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
A
u
th
or
is
at
io
n
V
al
u
at
io
n
D
el
eg
at
io
n
R
e-
or
ga
n
is
at
io
n
Space
U.S.A.,
Canada
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Time 2003 x x x x x x x x x x x x
Matter
3175
subnets
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Process
All
Internet-
based
processes
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Result
Network
not
available
from 4 to
48 hours
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Reason for the classification:
Complete unavailability for all of the functions foreseen by the Disciplines.
3.4 Cyber-war in Estonia and Middle-East
In April 2007, a massive distributed denial-of service (DDoS) attack over-
whelmed most of Estonias Internet infrastructure, bringing online activity
almost to a standstill. The targets were not military websites but civilian
sites belonging to organisations such as banks, newspapers, internet service
providers (ISPs), and even home users. Much of the onslaught came from
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hackers using ISP addresses in Russia, but the most devastating element
in the attack was a botnet which co-opted millions of previously virus in-
fected computers around the globe to pummel the Estonian infrastructure
communications. The botnet fooled Estonian network routers into con-
tinuously resending useless packets of information to one another, rapidly
flooding the infrastructure used to conduct all online business in the coun-
try. The attack was centered mainly on small websites which were easy to
knock out, but nevertheless was devastatingly effective. Bank websites be-
came unreachable, paralysing most of Estonias financial activity. Press sites
also came under attack, in an attempt to disable news sources. ISPs were
overwhelmed, blacking out internet access for significant portions of the
population. The report does not mention how the computers were infected
in the first place, creating a vast network of bot computers.
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Space
Estonia,
Russia
x x x
Time 2007 x x x
Matter
Several
web
sites,
huge
number
of PCs
x x x
Process
All
Internet-
based
govern-
ment
and bank
processes
x x x
Result
Processes
inter-
rupted
for 2
days
x x x
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Reason for the classification:
Lack in modelling for the botnet.
Lack in synchronisation for the denial of service attack.
Lack in re-organisation for the late response of the ISPs to the attack.
Remark:
The overall effect of this incident is a complete lack in the availability of
Internet connection for “significant portions of the population” for two days.
In this perspective, the incident should have been categorized as a complete
blackout as in section 3.3 above. Nevertheless, we would like to keep distinct
the two cases since, at least in principle, a rapid re-organisation of the
network could have mitigated the effects of the Estonian case.
3.5 Global Energy Cyber-attacks: Night
Dragon
Starting in November 2009, coordinated covert and targeted cyber-attacks
have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical compa-
nies. These attacks have involved social engineering, spear-phishing attacks,
exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Mi-
crosoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration
tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary
operations and project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field
bids and operations. In some cases, the files were copied to and downloaded
from company web servers by the attackers. In certain cases, the attackers
collected data from SCADA (Industrial Process Control) systems.
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Space
China
U.S.A.,
Taiwan,
Grece,
Kaza-
khstan
x x x
Time 2009 x x x
Matter
Servers
of several
private
compa-
nies
x x x
Process
Data
recording
and
e-mail
exchange
x x x
Result
Copy
confiden-
tial
informa-
tion
x x x
Reason for the classification:
Lack in modelling for MS Windows, Active Directory vulnerabilities and
access to SCADA systems.
Lack in identification for social engineering and phishing.
Unauthorised copy of information.
3.6 Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Internet Infrastructure
In 2005, the Gulf Coast of United States was affected by a devastating
Hurricane Katrina and caused ravaging through central Florida and Texas,
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with the most severe destruction occurring in New Orleans, Louisiana and
Mississippi. It caused large scale network disruption in some cases up to 72
hours.
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Space U.S.A. x x x x x x x x x x x x
Time 2005 x x x x x x x x x x x x
Matter
134
subnets
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Process
All
Internet-
based
processes
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Result
Network
unavail-
able for
72 hours
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Reason for the classification:
Complete unavailability for all of the functions foreseen by the Disciplines.
3.7 DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach
DigiNotar B.V. — a subsidiary of VASCO Data Security International based
in The Netherlands — was a company providing digital certificate services.
Certificates issued include default SSL certificates, qualified certificates and
“PKIoverheid” (Dutch Government accredited) certificates.
In July 2011, DigiNotar detected an intrusion into its certificate au-
thority infrastructure resulting in the issue of fraudulent SSL certificates
for several popular domains like google.com, microsoft.com, skype.com, ad-
dons.mozilla.org, login.live.com, login.yahoo.com, twitter.com, android.com,
facebook.com, torproject.org, . . .
In total, 531 fraudulent certificates were generated by an attacker. The
attacker’s original points of entry into the DigiNotar network were two web
servers located in the company’s demilitarized zone (DMZ).
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The evidence suggests that the hacker was located in Iran and a signa-
ture left in a text file points to him being the same attacker who compro-
mised the Comodo certificate authority in March 2011.
It appears that the attacker made available to others one or more cer-
tificates and that the one for google.com was used to gain access to Gmail
users accounts. The companies and institutions compromised by fraudolent
certificates revoked the trust in certificates issued by DigiNotar at different
time rates, leaving the users exposed to further exploits for a certain period
of time, in some cases until end of September 2011.
Vasco Data Security International announced DigiNotar bankruptcy —
after filling for voluntary bankruptcy — on September 20th, 2011.
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Space
The
Nether-
lands,
Iran
x x (x)
Time 2011 x x (x)
Matter
Servers
of one
Author-
ity
Certifi-
cates
x x (x)
Process
Encrypt-
ion
x x (x)
Result
Unknown
number
of users
without
secure
commu-
nication
channels
x x (x)
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Reason for the classification:
Lack in modelling (in parenthesis since the used tactics is not explicitly
reported) for the access to the internal network of the company through
the DMZ.
Lack in composition for the production of fake certificates.
Lack in cancellation policy for the irregular revocation of the counterfeit
certificates.
3.8 Malware for Political Espionage
A political figure continued to receive spear-phishing emails that lured
him into clicking on shortcuts or opening attachments with file extensions,
.doc(x), .xls(x), . . . and so on. (Microsoft Office document exploit). A
document *.doc sent via email was the “two stage Dropper that injected
the malware”. The malware was a narrow-spread espionage software used
for exfiltration of email/messaging passwords and documentation related
information from the victims computer.
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Hong
Kong,
China
x x x
Time 2011 x x x
Matter 1 PC x x x
Process
e-mail
exchange
x x x
Result
Copy of
sensitive
informa-
tion
x x x
Reason for the classification:
Unauthorised copy of information.
Lack in the identification for the phishing e-mail.
Lack in modelling for the “Microsoft Office document exploit”.
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3.9 Stuxnet
Stuxnet initially spreads via Microsoft Windows, and targets Siemens in-
dustrial software and equipment.
Its final goal is to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) by modify-
ing code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to make them work in a
manner the attacker intended and to hide those changes from the operator
of the equipment. The attack was performed with the use of several distinct
tactics like zero-day exploits, a Windows rootkit, the first ever PLC rootkit,
installation of new drivers, antivirus evasion techniques, hooking code, at
least two command and control remote sites . . .
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Space
Iran plus
several
other
countries
x x x x x
Time
2009 -
2012
x x x x x
Matter
Some in-
dustrial
control
systems
plus
100000
infected
hosts
x x x x x
Process ICS x x x x x
Result
Repro-
gramming
of the
ICS
x x x x x
The drivers used needed to be digitally signed. The attackers compromised
two digital certificates to achieve this task. Information on the attacked
industrial plant was sent to the command and control sites.
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Exploit
To infect their target, Stuxnet would need to be introduced into the
target environment. This may have occurred by infecting a willing or un-
knowing third party, such as a contractor who perhaps had access to the
facility, or an insider. The original infection may have been introduced by
removable drive.
Reason for the classification:
Unauthorised copy of information for the information sent to the command
and control sites.
Lack in composition for the compromised certificates.
Lack in re-oganisation for the Industrial Control System not returning au-
tomatically to a safe state.
Lack in modelling for the “zero-day exploits”.
3.10 Malicious Activity Associated with
Aurora Internet Explorer Exploit
Malicious activity detected in mid-December 2009 targeted at least 20 or-
ganisations representing multiple industries including chemical, finance, in-
formation technology, and media. Investigation into this activity revealed
that third parties routinely accessed the personal email accounts of dozens
of users based in the United States, China, and Europe.
Further analysis revealed these users were victims of previous phishing
scams through which threat actors successfully gained access to their email
accounts. The malware used in this incident, exploited a vulnerability in
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE). The vulnerability if successfully exploited,
allows for remote code execution.
Among the targeted organisations, Google corporate infrastructure was
the primary target, together with the Adobe Systems and several other high
profile companies. The attack resulted in IP theft.
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U.S.A.,
China,
Europe
x x x
Time 2009 x x x
Matter
Office
PC of
several
compa-
nies
x x x
Process
e-mail
exchange
x x x
Result
Copy of
sensitive
informa-
tion
x x x
Reason for the classification:
Unauthorised copy of information.
Lack in identification for the phishing.
Lack in modelling for the Microsoft Internet Explorer vulnerability.
3.11 EU sites blocked for anonymous users
In 2012, the European Commission blocked access to public information to
anonymous users. Users received the following error message when trying
to access the site of the EU Commission: “Network Error (gateway error)
Server overloaded. The gateway may be temporarily unavailable, or there
could be a network problem. For assistance, contact your network support
team.” It was thus shown not transparent and that the IP address was
blocked specifically, nor explains why anonymous users were denied access
to public information sites.
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Space E.U. x x
Time 2012 x x
Matter
E.U. web
servers
x x
Process
Access to
E.U.
public
informa-
tion
x x
Result
Denied
access
for a
category
of users
x x
Reason for the classification:
Lack in an explicit authorisation policy for the access to the EU official web
sites.
Difference in value given to information accessed by distinct categories of
users.
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Chapter 4
Plan for the improvement of
this taxonomy
The proposed taxonomy and method of classification is subject to several
improvements. We foresee three principal directions: 1) from qualitative to
comparative measurement; 2) refinement of the “physical” classification; 3)
translation to other languages.
Concerning the first point, the proposed taxonomy provides a pure qual-
itative assessment of the incidents analysed. No comparison is presently
possible between two incidents for weighting their relative importance. A
first step in this direction could be a pure “counting” of the ‘x’ in the indi-
vidual tables: to more ‘x’ should correspond a more serious incident. This
hypotesis has still to be verified with the cases studied and with the ad-
dition of more incidents covering the Disciplines in a more complete way.
For example, delegation is not presently used for the classification of any
incident. A subsequent step in this direction will eventually lead to a nu-
merical “absolute” evaluation of the severity of incidents by associating a
number taken from a given scale to each case.
For the second possible improvement, a refinement of the five “physical”
categories in the vertical organisation of the tables proposed in the previous
chapter. This can be done quite easily in some cases. For example, in case
of Internet attacks, the Space category could be divided in two distinct lo-
cations for origin and target. To the end of the refinement of the “physical”
categories, the work already done in [7] and [1] is a valuable base.
Concerning the third possible improvement, we should consider that
the final aim of this work is the production of a common nomenclature and
valuation process for both the operators and the public at large allowing for
a quick reference to the severity of incidents in communication systems. To
this end, the availability of the classification system in the main European
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languages could be a fundamental point for its effective use.
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